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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, Subject to Assignment in the 
: Utah Court of Appeals 
v. 
THOMAS CHARLES POWELL, Case No. 20050810-SC 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE. 
: Incarcerated 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this criminal case involving first degree felony 
convictions entered in a court of record, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on attempted murder based on 
knowing and depraved indifference mens rea levels? 
Standard of Review: Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness, without 
deference to the trial court. Rg, Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was not preserved by trial counsel. Powell relies on the doctrines of 
plain error, exceptional circumstances and ineffective assistance of counsel in raising this 
issue. 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing Powell's lesser included offense instructions? 
Standard of Review: Rulings on jury instructions are reviewed for correctness, 
without deference to the trial court. Kg, Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved by trial counsel (R. 105-108, R. 236 at 226-330). 
3. Does the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and errors in the 
admission of evidence require a new trial? 
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of 
discretion standard, and will reverse of the prosecutor's conduct or remarks called the 
jury's attention to improper matters in circumstances indicating a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result absent the misconduct. See, State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, H 22, 999 
P.2d 7. 
Rulings on the admission of evidence are reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., 
Cazeras v. Cosbv. 2003 UT 3, f 11, 65 P.3d 1184. 
These issues were largely not preserved by trial counsel. Powell relies on the 
doctrines of plain error, exceptional circumstances and ineffective assistance of counsel 
in raising these issues. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Mr. Powell and co-defendant Tamara Ross with aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, and aggravated 
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burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203, with a gun 
enhancement (R. 5-7). Following preliminary hearing, the magistrate ordered Powell 
bound over on an amended information (R. 49). 
The State then filed an amended information adding the charge against Powell and 
Ross of attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-203 (R. 56), as indicated at the outset of the preliminary hearing (R. 228 at 4). The 
attempted murder count was charged under theories of knowing, intentional, or depraved 
indifference mens rea levels (R. 56). 
The jurors convicted Powell of aggravated burglary and attempted murder and 
acquitted him of aggravated robbery (R. 127, 172-76). 
Judge Atherton sentenced Powell to a term of five years to life for the aggravated 
burglary conviction and a consecutive term of one to fifteen years for the attempted 
murder conviction (R. 188-189). Trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 190, 
201). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic factual theory of the State's case was that Powell entered a motel room 
occupied by Roselynn Ellis, tried to sell her a bag of old clothes, pulled a gun and 
made a clicking noise with it after threatening to kill Ellis if she moved, pistol whipped 
Ellis with the gun, stole Ellis' purse before she pursued him to a Cadillac occupied by 
Powell's co-defendant Tamara Ross, and then drove away from Ellis while pointing the 
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gun at Ellis and pulling the trigger without firing (R. 235 at 65-70; 113-128). 
To prove the facts essential to the State's theory, the State had two witnesses 
Roselynn Ellis (R. 235 at 65-70) and Tamara Ross (R. 235 at 113-128). 
The jury apparently disbelieved at least part of their testimony, because the jury 
acquitted Powell of the aggravated robbery (R. 127, 172-76). 
Ellis had been smoking crack cocaine and drinking alcohol for hours prior to the 
alleged offenses (R. 235 at 143). She was nearsighted and required corrective lenses, but 
was not wearing any, and her opportunity to view her assailant was limited by the stress 
of the events and the fact that her assailant's face was partially covered by his hat (R. 235 
at 135, 177, R. 236 at 201). She described her assailant in a manner that was inconsistent 
with Powell's appearance (R. 235 at 140-41, 178), initially identified a relative of Tamara 
Ross's as her assailant (R. 236 at 279), and repeatedly did not identify Powell during a 
police show-up within hours of the offense, even when she was five feet away from him 
(R. 235 at 150, 179). It was only when she was within arm's length of him, when Ellis 
heard him speak and the police put a hat on him that she identified Powell as her assailant 
(R. 235 at 150). The police did not require Ross's relative, whom Ellis first identified as 
her assailant, to speak or put on a hat (R. 235 at 150, 152). 
Tamara Ross, who was an old acquaintance of Ellis' from the crack cocaine world, 
testified in exchange for the complete dismissal of charges identical to Powell's: 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder (R. 235 at 62-63, 90, 
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153). As an accomplice who inculpated Powell to protect herself from serious criminal 
liability, Ross was unreliable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 
541 (1986) (accomplice confession inculpating others is presumptively unreliable); Lilly 
v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (same). At the time of her testimony, Ross 
refrained from taking her prescription drugs, Seroquel and Eskalith,1 to avoid being 
drowsy in court (R. 235 at 75). In the hours prior to the alleged offenses, in addition to 
taking her mental health medications, she had been smoking crack cocaine (R. 235 at 76). 
She has a very long list of names, partly because she had been married seven or eight 
times, and goes by Denise, Cheyenne, Annette Coleman, Delores Davis, Tamara 
Williams, Tamara Jackson, Tamara Gordon and Tamara Ross (R. 235 at 84-86). She was 
convicted of giving false information to the police, when she once claimed to be her 
niece, Sonya Salters, to avoid a warrant (R. 235 at 83). She also had a forgery conviction 
(R. 235 at 84). 
Ellis testified that before the alleged offenses, she saw Tamara Ross sitting in the 
Cadillac outside Ellis' motel room, and was concerned by Ross's wearing a blonde wig 
that she normally did not wear (R. 235 at 117). Ross gave inconsistent testimony 
indicating that Ellis apparently owed Ross some money for clothing Ross had bought for 
Ellis' daughter (R. 235 at 87-88), while Ellis maintained that Ross had given her some 
1
 These psychotropic medications are used to treat bi-polar disorder and 
schizophrenia. See, e.g., www: Drugs.com. 
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children's clothing, but that she could not recall owing Ross any money (R, 235 at 144). 
The police stopped the Cadillac hours after Ellis called and reported the offenses, 
and it was being driven by two young men who were relatives of Tamara Ross and 
affiliates of the "Funk Mobb," an association of family members and other people in 
Oakland, California (R. 235 at 77-78, 105). 
Ellis initially thought one of these two young men was her assailant (R. 236 at 
279). 
The police recovered a gun bearing Ellis' blood from the street after Ross's 
nephew, one of the two young men in the Cadillac, told them he had thrown it out the 
Cadillac window when he first saw the police (R. 235 at 99, 190-91, R. 236 at 235-46). 
The Cadillac contained a bag of clothes (R. 235 at 99). Ross's nephew claimed that 
Powell had given him the clothes and the gun and told him to get rid of them (R. 235 at 
95-96). 
The police did not fingerprint the gun, and there was no evidence of the identity of 
the registered owner (R. 235 at 192-93). The police did not find a magazine or clip for 
the gun (R. 236 at 259). Ross testified that after Powell got into the Cadillac, he found 
the clip underneath her where she had been sleeping and commented that that was why 
the gun did not work (R. 235 at 70). The State's armory expert explained that the trigger 
will not pull if the magazine is out because the gun safety feature disconnects the trigger 
(R. 236 at 261). The gun was tested and fired properly when the police bought and 
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inserted a clip (R. 236 at 264). 
Powell testified that he was not the assailant, and that Ellis had misidentified him 
(R. 236 at 293, 305). He conceded that he made some, but not all, of the inculpatory 
statements attributed to him by the police, but maintained that these statements were 
facetious, and made after Ellis had viewed him but not identified him, and while he had 
maintained his innocence (R. 236 at 203, 214). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
To prove attempted murder, the State must prove the mens rea level of intent to 
kill. The trial court's instructions permitting the jurors to convict for mens rea levels of 
knowledge or depraved indifference were harmful error. While trial counsel did not 
preserve the issue, this Court should address it, to avoid a manifest injustice. 
The trial court erred in refusing Powell's lesser included offense instructions on 
aggravated assault and assault. Ambiguities and inconsistencies in the State's evidence 
regarding the assailant's intent provided a rational basis for acquitting of attempted 
murder and convicting of aggravated assault or assault. To insure that Powell receives 
the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard of proof and that society's interests in the 
integrity of the criminal justice system are served, this Court should order a new trial 
wherein the lesser included offense instructions are given. 
The cumulative effect of the foregoing errors with the prejudice stemming from 
prosecutorial misconduct and other evidentiary errors justifies a new trial. To the extent 
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that the issues were not fully preserved by trial counsel, this Court should address and 
correct the errors under the plain error, exceptional circumstances or ineffective 
assistance of counsel doctrines. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION, 
PREMISED ON INSTRUCTIONS ON 
KNOWING OR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MENS REA LEVELS, 
MUST BE REVERSED. 
Consistent with the charge in the amended information (R. 56), the court instructed 
the jurors on attempted murder, with mens rea levels of depraved indifference, 
knowledge or intent (R. 165-67, Instructions 32 and 33).2 The court generally instructed 
the jurors that "a unanimous concurrence of all jurors is required to find a verdict" (R. 
170, Inst. 36), but did not instruct the jurors to reach a unanimous verdict on the mens rea 
theory for the attempted murder count. 
The jurors convicted Powell of attempted murder in a verdict which did not specify 
a mens rea theory (R. 174).3 
Attempted depraved indifference murder and knowing attempted murder are 
2These jury instructions are in the addendum. 
3The verdicts provided, 
We, the jurors impaneled in the above case, find the defendant, 
THOMAS CHARLES POWELL, Guilty of ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL 
HOMICIDE, MURDER, as charged in Count III of the information. 
(R. 174, 183). 
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nonexistent offenses under Utah law. See, State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106; 
State v. Perez. 2002 UT App 211, ffl 32-36, 52 P.3d 451; State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843 
(Utah 1992), overruled. State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106.4 This is so because 
attempted murder requires proof of specific intent to kill, and the depraved indifference 
and knowing mens reas do not rise to this level of specific intent. See Perez and Casey. 
While trial counsel did not raise this issue in the trial court, this Court should 
nonetheless correct the error on appeal under the exceptional circumstances, plain error 
and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, % 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Given that Casey was published years prior to this trial, the trial court plainly erred 
in failing to apply its very clear directive that an attempted murder conviction requires 
4In Casey, this Court overruled Vigil, holding that attempted murder requires proof 
of an intentional mens rea, and that a knowing mens rea will not suffice. 2003 UT 55, f^ 
8. 
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proof of specific intent to kill. See Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106, supra. 
Application of the manifest error doctrine is appropriate in this context, for Mr. 
Powell may be serving a separate consecutive sentence of one to fifteen years on the basis 
of an offense that does not exist under Utah law. See State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 
(Utah 1993) (per curiam) (reversing conviction for attempted depraved indifference 
murder to avoid manifest injustice and violation of Due Process Clauses of state and 
federal constitutions, because Haston might be imprisoned for a non-existent offense). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Powell must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied 513 U.S. 966(1994). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e.g.. State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at *[f 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes 
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by the courts with 
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the 
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have 
been valid trial strategy). 
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The legal definition of crimes and jury instructions pertaining thereto are not snap 
decisions that must be made in the heat of battle with the jury present, but can and should 
be researched and studied well in advance of any trial, particularly a serious felony trial. 
Failing to challenge the depraved indifference and knowing mens reas underlying 
the attempted murder count was objectively deficient performance; there was and could 
have been no valid strategic reason for trial counsel to have refrained from raising the 
issue. Compare, e.g.. State v. Moritzky, 771 P.2d 688, 691-93 (Utah App. 1989) (trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance in obtaining a jury instruction on defense of 
habitation which lacked helpful presumption provided in amended defense of habitation 
statute, resulting the denial of a fair trial and the need for a new trial). 
The giving of an attempted depraved indifference or knowing murder instruction 
constitutes prejudicial error as long as the jurors may have concluded that the defendant 
did not act with the specific intent to kill. See, e.g., Perez at ^ 29-32. 
Utah law recognizes that proof of an intentional shooting, and/or shooting at close 
range do not necessarily establish the requisite intent for an attempted murder conviction. 
See Perez at fflj 29-30, citing State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (per 
curiam); and State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988 992 (Utah App. 1993). 
In the instant matter, the jurors may well have concluded that Powell did not 
harbor the specific intent to kill. The only two witnesses who testified regarding Powell's 
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alleged intent were Roselynn Ellis and Tamara Ross.5 
Ellis' version of events was that Powell knocked on her motel room door, entered 
without her assistance because the doorknob was broken, showed her and tried to sell her 
some old clothes without her asking him to leave, and then put a gun to her head, telling 
her, "Move and I'll kill you, bitch." (R. 235 at 121). She testified that she responded by 
turning, looking him in the eye, and instructing him, "Do it." (R. 235 at 121-22; R. 228 at 
10). She heard a clicking sound, and the a bullet landed on her shoe (R. 235 at 22). She 
testified that he then hit her very hard on the head with the butt of the gun perhaps nine to 
eleven times until she kicked him and knocked him off the bed, fought with him for the 
gun, and then cased him out of the room with the gun in his hand (R. 235 at 123-24). She 
testified that she grabbed a phone, called 911, and ran to the car, where she held onto 
Powell's car door trying to stop him from closing the door (R. 235 at 126). Ellis said she 
heard Tamara Ross say, "Kill the bitch," and Powell said something to the effect of "Kill 
her, I'm trying," or "Kill her, I can't even knock her out" or "I couldn't even knock her 
out." (R. 235 at 127). Ellis said he pointed the gun at her face and pulled the trigger from 
about a foot away, but again the gun did not fire (R. 235 at 127). Ellis then proceeded to 
5The State's armory expert testified that the bullet they found in Ellis' motel room 
was a hollow point bullet, a particularly dangerous type which expands when fired, and 
that if the gun the police recovered had shot this bullet right into a person's head, it likely 
would have been fatal (R, 236 at 266). There was, however, no evidence that the 
assailant was pointing the gun at or directly next to Ellis's head when he made the 
clicking sound with the gun after she turned and told him to kill her, or that the assailant 
knew that the gun contained such a bullet. 
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a different motel room to confront the man she thought "set her up," and then went with 
the police to the show-ups involving Ross's two young men relatives and then Powell (R. 
235 at 128-130). While Ellis' head was injured and bled, she declined medical treatment 
(R. 235 at 133). 
As detailed above in the statement of facts, supra, Ellis suffered from credibility 
problems, and the jurors must have found her testimony incredible in some respects, 
because they acquitted Powell of the aggravated robbery despite her testimony that her 
purse was gone after he left the room (R. 235 at 125). They likewise may have found her 
testimony regarding his use of a gun wholly or partly incredible. Given Powell's 
supposed alternative statement that he was trying to knock her out (R. 235 at 127), and 
particularly in the absence of evidence that the gun was still against or pointed at Ellis' 
head when she turned and instructed Powell to kill her and heard the click of the gun, and 
given that the gun was clearly not functioning when he pulled the trigger (R. 235 at 121-
22, 127; R. 228 at 10), the jurors may have believed that he was trying to frighten and 
control her with the gun, and may not have believed that it was his intent to kill her. 
As detailed in the statement of facts, supra, Tamara Ross suffered from credibility 
problems, and the jurors must have disbelieved at least part of her testimony, because they 
acquitted Powell of the aggravated robbery charge, despite Ross's testimony that Powell 
took something from a purse and then threw the purse onto the freeway (R. 235 at 69). 
They likewise may have distrusted her testimony that Powell awakened her when he ran 
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to the car bloody and with a gun in hand, and that Ellis tried to block the door of the car 
so Powell could not get in (R. 235 at 66-67).6 Ross testified that Powell said something 
like I ' m going to kill you," and pulled the trigger of the gun, which did not fire (R. 235 
at 68).7 The jurors may have found her testimony particularly incredible, given her claims 
that she was referring to someone other than Ellis when she asked Powell, "Did you kill 
the bitch?" (R. 235 at 69). 
Given the jury instructions and general verdict, and the fundamentally questionable 
nature of the State's witnesses and the inconsistencies in their statements, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the attempted murder conviction rests on jury findings of mens 
reas less than specific intent to kill. Compare Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (jurors 
instructed on knowing and intentional mens reas and convicted of attempted murder; 
Court found that verdict necessarily reflected intentional mens rea, because defendant 
threatened to kill the victim, put the gun to victim's neck, pointed the gun at the victim's 
head and misfired, pointed the gun at the victim's feet and fired, and then fired the gun 
again as the victim was retreating); State v. Haston. 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 and n.l (Utah 
1993) (Court reversed conviction for attempted depraved indifference murder; Haston 
6Ellis did not testify that she tried to block Powell from getting in the car. She 
testified that she held onto the window to prevent him from closing the door (R. 235 at 
126). 
7Ellis did not testify that Powell threatened to kill her, but instead testified that in 
response to Ross's command that he "kill the bitch," he responded, "Kill her, I'm trying," 
or "Kill her, I can't even knock her out" or "I couldn't even knock her out." (R. 235 at 
127). 
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shot victim in the chest at close range during a drunken quarrel). See also State v. Perez, 
2002 UT App 211 f 31, 52 P.3d 451 (noting Haston admitted that he intentionally shot his 
victim). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse Powell's conviction for attempted murder. 
See Casey and Haston, supra. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
POWELL'S LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Trial counsel submitted instructions for lesser included offenses of aggravated 
assault and assault (R. 105-108, R. 236 at 226-330). In closing argument, the prosecutor 
argued that Powell intended to assault Ellis (R. 237 at 339). 
However, the court refused to instruct on the lesser included offenses, stating, 
I have reviewed the testimony here and there certainly is a possibility 
that the jury would not believe any of the witnesses. However, the State's 
case does not just hinge on the testimony of Ms. Ellis. Ms. Ross herself 
testified that the defendant turned to the victim and said, I'm going to kill 
you, clicked the gun two times, pointing it at this victim's head in the car as 
well. So you have more than one witness. The standard here is a rational 
basis for an acquittal and of the greater offense and the conviction of the 
included or lesser offense. 
Based on looking at all of the evidence that the jury will weigh, the 
jury can always acquit, but a rational basis for an acquittal and of a 
conviction of a lesser offense I just cannot find by the evidence and so I'm 
going to not permit the lesser included offenses. Were they to believe the 
witnesses, then it would clearly fall under an attempted murder. That is, 
pointing the gun to the victim's head and pulling the trigger on four 
different occasions, two times inside, two times outside the motel room, and 
that is attempted murder. 
(R. 236 at 329-330). 
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The trial court's finding that Powell pointed the gun at Ellis' head and pulled the 
trigger twice while she was in the motel room is clearly erroneous and there is no 
evidence to marshall in support of it. 
Ellis testified that he had the gun to her head, that she turned to him and told him 
to do it, and that she heard a clicking sound (R. 235 at 122). The prosecutor asked, "After 
you heard the noise that indicated that he was trying to fire the gun into your head, did 
you hear him do anything else to the handgun?" and she answered, "I just heard clicking 
and then the bullet was - landed on my - hit my shoe." (R. 235 at 122). 
The trial court's rationale, that when some shoots at another person multiple times 
at close range this is necessarily attempted murder (R. 236 at 329-330), conflicts with 
those Utah cases which recognize the contrary proposition - that shooting someone, even 
successfully, from close range, does not necessarily establish intent to kill. See, e.g., 
Haston and Tmoco, supra. 
As a matter of law, the trial court should have given the lesser included offense 
instructions. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires the government to prove elements of criminal offenses beyond a reasonable 
doubt. ELg,, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The standard applies in all federal 
and state courts. E.g., Sullivan v. La., 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). The reasonable doubt 
standard gives "concrete substance" to the presumption of innocence, and thereby creates 
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public confidence in the criminal justice system. Winship at 363-64. It also serves the 
defendants' liberty interests and protects the defendants from the stigma of criminal 
convictions. Id. at 363. "It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be 
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being 
condemned." Id. 
Lesser included offense instructions are designed to insure that all criminal 
defendants get the full benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. State 
v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah 1984). Due process requires lesser included offense 
instructions when the evidence warrants them, because our courts recognize that jurors 
may convict of charged offenses in the absence of legally adequate proof of the charged 
offenses if the only alternative is setting free someone who is clearly guilty of some 
violent crime. The lesser included offense doctrine thus provides the jurors with a 
compromise option between conviction of the charged offense and outright acquittal. 
See, e.g.. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) indicates that a defendant may be convicted of a 
lesser included offense, which is defined as follows: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included 
offense. 
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The same statute provides in subsection (4) that no lesser included offense 
instruction need be given unless "there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
Under the test of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Court first 
considers whether the elements of the charged and lesser offenses overlap and may be 
proved by the same facts, and then requires lesser offense instructions if there is an 
alternative interpretation of the evidence which provides a rational basis for acquitting of 
the greater offense and convicting of the lesser. Id. at 160. In assessing whether a lesser 
included offense instruction should have been given, this Court views the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). 
Courts review the "whole of the evidence" in assessing whether there is basis for a 
lesser included instruction; a defendant need not admit his guilt of the lesser included 
offense in order to justify the lesser offense instruction. See State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 
551, 555-56 (Utah 1984) (Court reversed conviction for aggravated assault for lack of a 
lesser included offense instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, despite the 
fact that the defendant denied pointing his gun at the officer). 
There are some cases which may be read as precluding a lesser included offense 
instruction in cases wherein the defendant denies having committed the crime. E.g., State 
v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (trial court did not err in refusing lesser 
included offense instruction on manslaughter in a case wherein the evidence did not 
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support the manslaughter theory and defendant's evidence was that he did not commit the 
murder). 
In the instant matter, Powell's theory of the case - that Ellis misidentified him as 
the assailant - was compatible with the lesser included offense instructions, which may 
have more accurately captured the assailant's intent than the attempted murder 
instructions. 
Particularly because the lesser included offense doctrine is designed to give all 
defendants the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard, e.g., Oldroyd, supra, and because 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is designed to instill community confidence in the 
criminal justice system, see Winship, supra, society's interests call for the giving of a 
reasonable doubt instruction whenever there is a rational basis anywhere in the whole of 
the evidence to acquit the defendant of the offense charged, see Baker, supra. 
Applying the Baker analysis here confirms that the trial court should have given 
the lesser included offense instruction. Attempted murder, aggravated assault and assault 
do have overlapping elements which may be proved by the same facts. An attempted 
murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill and the taking of a substantial step 
toward causing the death of another which strongly corroborates the intent to cause that 
person's death. See, e.g.. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^  14 and 15. An assault 
conviction may be premised on proof of attempts to, threats of, or causing a bodily injury. 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (defining assault).8 An aggravated assault conviction 
may be premised on proof of assaults involving deadly weapons or the intentional 
infliction of serious bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (defining aggravated 
assault).9 See also State v. Tunzt 2001 UT App 224, p , 31 P.3d 588 (noting in dicta that 
court instructed on aggravated assault, lesser offense of attempted murder), overruled on 
other grounds. State v. Tunzl 2002 UT 119, 63 P.3d 70. 
In this instance, if given the opportunity with correct instructions, the jurors may 
8§ 76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
9§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
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well have acquitted Powell of attempted murder and convicted of aggravated assault or 
simple assault, either because the actions attested to by Ellis and/or Ross (his threatening 
to kill if she moved, repeatedly pulling the trigger of a gun that did not fire, hitting Ellis 
over the head with a gun, and perhaps making a statement that he tried to knock her out) 
did not establish specific intent to kill, or because the jurors did not believe either Ellis or 
Ross regarding exactly what occurred, and were left to rely on the only conclusive 
physical evidence to sustain a assault conviction: Ellis' bleeding head. 
Because our society has no interest in incarcerating Powell for a greater offense 
than a properly instructed jury would convict him of, and has a vested interest in the 
integrity and full benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, see Winship, 
supra, this Court should reverse Powell's attempted murder conviction and instruct the 
trial court to give the lesser included offense instructions on retrial. See Baker, supra, 
III. 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND 
EVIDENTIARY ERRORS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
If the cumulative effect of multiple errors undermines this Court's confidence in 
the fairness of a trial, this Court will order a new one. See, e.g.. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 
35, Tf 25, 999 P.2d 7. Mr. Powell asserts the cumulative error doctrine with regard to all 
of the errors in his case, particularly with regard to the prosecutorial misconduct and other 
evidentiary errors discussed infra. 
Utah law has long recognized that a criminal trial is supposed to be a search for the 
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truth, rather than a mere contest between the defense and prosecution. In State v. 
Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, the Court explained the special role of the 
prosecutor, which does not call for overreaching, but which requires constant vigilance 
for fairness. The Court stated, 
Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above those of 
privately employed attorneys ff[P]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all 
improper tactics." ... 
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is 
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he 
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one." 
Id. at 961 (citations omitted). 
If a prosecutor's comments taint the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, the 
arguments violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. See. 
e.g.. Darden v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).11 Claims of prosecutorial 
10See, e ^ , Statev.Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 
662 (Utah 1985); State v. JarrelL 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980). 
11
 Article I §§ 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution provide due process of law and the 
right to a fair trial, as does Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Article I § 7, the due process 
provision, has been interpreted as requiring exclusion of unreliable evidence which is 
likely to be unduly impressive to jurors, see State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), 
and as requiring an inquiry into the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see 
generally Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Article I § 12 provides 
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misconduct require a fact-specific inquiry which is guided by the defendant's 
constitutional rights to a fair trial.12 
In Utah, the general test for prosecutorial misconduct is set forth in State v. Troy, 
688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), as follows: 
"The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call 
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those remarks." 
Id. at 486 (citation omitted). Arguing matters unsupported by evidence violates Troy. Id. 
The Troy Court persuasively explained the prejudice analysis further, 
Step two is more difficult and involves a consideration of the 
circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is 
appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt. 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or 
remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Likewise, in a case with less 
compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the 
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of 
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in 
weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be especially susceptible 
the general procedural and substantive rights of criminal defendants to insure the 
fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. See, generally. State v. Anderson, 612 
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). When a prosecutor's arguments draw the jurors' attention away 
from the merits of the case, and call into question the reliability and fairness of the 
proceedings and verdict or sentence, these provisions are implicated. 
12See United States v. Soconv-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (194Q)("Of 
course, appeals to passion and prejudice may so poison the minds of the jurors even in a 
strong case that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial.... [Ejach case necessarily turns 
on its own facts."). 
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to influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the 
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any 
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering. 
Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted). 
It is the State's burden to show that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa. 720P.2d 1368, 1373 andn.21 (Utah 1986). All 
reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 
1114, 1116 (Utah 1977).13 
Powell's prosecutor argued in closing that Powell attempted to shoot Ellis twice in 
the motel room and that he racked the gun in between attempts in an effort to load a bullet 
into the chamber, thereby proving his intent to kill Ellis. He stated, 
He presses it to her head and says, Move, bitch, and you die. And 
shortly thereafter, he tries to make it come true by pulling the trigger. The 
gun does not fire. And Sergeant Huggard told you why the gun didn't fire. 
The magazine wasn't in it. But there was a round in the chamber. He really 
wants to kill this woman. 
What does he do? He racks the slide back, and you saw Sergeant 
Huggard demonstrate it, you watched the dummy round go flying, and the 
slide goes forward and he's thinking that another round is being fed from 
the magazine into the chamber, puts it to her head again and pulls the 
trigger. That is intentional, that is depraved, and it shows very clearly his 
intent of what he wanted to do at that moment; kill her. 
Remember Sergeant Huggard told you about the little red buttons on 
the gun that indicated when it was ready to fire, so he had to have been 
aware that that gun was ready to go. 
13More recent opinions from this Court have stated differing standards. See, e.g.. 
State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)(a defendant must show that the results would 
likely have been more favorable in the absence of the misconduct). 
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(R. 237 at 342). 
The prosecutor echoed this argument in his final rebuttal closing, wherein he 
argued that Powell tried to "blow her brains out" on four separate occasions (R. 237 at 
369). 
The prosecutor drew the jurors' attention to facts not in evidence in these 
arguments and violated the fairness of Powell's trial, because there is no evidence that 
Powell tried to shoot Ellis four times or ever racked the gun to put a bullet in place to 
shoot Ellis. 
Ellis did not testify that Powell tried to shoot her twice in the motel room, or that 
he racked the gun in the motel room. She testified that he had the gun to her head and 
threatened to kill her if she moved, that she turned to him and told him to do it, and that 
she heard a clicking sound (R. 235 at 122). The prosecutor asked, "After you heard the 
noise that indicated that he was trying to fire the gun into your head, did you hear him do 
anything else to the handgun?" and she answered, "I just heard clicking and then the 
bullet was - landed on my - hit my shoe." (R. 235 at 122), 
While it is true that the State's armory expert, Alex Huggard, demonstrated to the 
jury that if the gun is racked, the bullet ejects (R. 264), he did not testify that racking the 
gun loads bullets into the chamber to be fired. Instead, he testified that because the gun is 
a semi-automatic, it automatically feeds the next bullet into place each time the trigger 
pulls (R. 264). Thus, the prosecutor was incorrect in arguing to the jury that Powell's 
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supposed racking of the gun demonstrated Powell's intent to kill, because there was no 
evidence that Powell racked the gun, and in any event, racking the gun would eject, not 
load, a bullet, thus running counter to any intent to kill. 
While Huggard also testified that the gun has a visible button indicating when the 
firing pin is cocked and a round is in the chamber ready to fire (R. 264), there is no 
evidence that this button was visible when the assailant had the gun or that this 
demonstrated his intent to kill. Rather, because the bullet apparently fell out of the gun 
when the assailant tried to fire it (R. 235 at 122), it appears that the bullet was not in the 
chamber ready to be fired, because in order to get the bullet out of the gun during the 
demonstrations, the State's expert did not attempt to fire the gun without the clip, but 
instead racked the slide back to eject the bullet from the chamber (R. 235 at 264). 
Given the poor quality of the State's witnesses essential to the charges, whom the 
jury did not entirely believe, see Statement of Facts, supra, the State cannot meet its 
burden to prove this misconduct harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tarafa, supra, 
and assuming he must, Powell can show a reasonable likelihood of a different result 
absent this misconduct, see Hay, supra. The attempted murder verdict may have rested 
entirely on the prosecutor's misleading argument that Powell was trying to rack a bullet 
into the firing chamber prior to pulling the trigger a second time in the motel room, for 
this graphic image is far more suggestive of intent to kill than merely pulling the trigger 
of a gun that does not fire, an action which might occur in an effort to frighten or control, 
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rather than to kill. 
Particularly when the prejudice from these closing arguments is considered in 
conjunction with that caused by additional errors, this Court should conclude that a new 
trial is warranted. See Kohl supra. 
In cross-examining Mr. Powell, without objection by trial counsel, the prosecutor 
asked him if he had been convicted of a felony, and Mr. Powell answered yes (R. 236 at 
319). The prosecutor did not elaborate on this to establish any bearing on Powell's 
credibility under Utah R. Evid. 609, or to establish a legitimate purpose for such 
evidence, such as to establish modus operandi or intent under 404(b). Rather, the 
question appears to have been designed solely to persuade the jurors to convict Powell on 
the theory of criminal propensity, in violation of well established Utah law. See, e.g.. 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951 (citing extensive case law prohibiting 
the admission of evidence of the defendant's other crimes unless the evidence is probative 
of something other than criminal propensity and is not unduly prejudicial). 
In order to introduce prior crimes evidence against a criminal defendant, the 
proponent must first establish a non-character purpose for the evidence. See, e.g.. State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^ J 21, 993 P.2d 837. Because this was never done in this case, the 
evidence was inadmissible. See id. 
The prosecutor established in cross-examining Powell that Powell did not use an 
alias when he was booked, but used his own name (R. 236 at 319). Over hearsay and lack 
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of personal knowledge objections, the State's case manager was allowed to testify in 
rebuttal that Powell used and was booked under the name James Johnson (R. 236 at 322). 
Trial counsel established that the case manager had no personal knowledge of this (R. 236 
at 323). 
At the end of his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor dramatically 
emphasized this testimony in arguing that Powell had lied to the jury. He stated, 
Now, do you remember yesterday when the defendant testified, he 
swore to tell you the truth. And you have several jury instructions that talk 
about if people tell lies you can disregard their entire testimony. Well, the 
defendant, Thomas Charles Powell, told you a lie yesterday. But the last 
thing he said, he told you, and you probably wondered why I was getting 
obsessive about it, And what name did you tell the police? Thomas. When 
the police brought you out what name did you give them? Thomas. And 
then when you were taken away and then you - did you give them your last 
name? Thomas Powell. Detective Burningham the case manager, the case 
manager who puts all the reports together, the name that was given to the 
police that morning was James Johnson. He can't even tell you the truth. 
(R. 237 at 369). 
The trial court was correct in overruling trial counsel's hearsay objection, because 
Powell's supposed assertion that his name was James Johnson was not admitted to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."). 
As trial counsel correctly objected (R. 236 at 322), the trial court should not have 
permitted the case manager to attest to this, because the case manager had no personal 
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knowledge that Powell gave the police the name of James Johnson. See Utah R. Evid. 
602. When witnesses are allowed to testify without personal knowledge, this defeats the 
purpose of Rule 602, to insure that the witness knows what he is talking about. See Fox 
v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 453 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1969). More importantly, in this criminal 
case, permitting the case manager to testify to Powell's supposed provision of an alias to 
the police effectively foreclosed Powell's exercise of his right to confront the witness 
against him, because whoever wrote the report identifying Powell as James Johnson was 
never brought before the jurors, placed under oath, and subjected to cross-examination 
prior to the jury's assessment of this person's credibility. But see, e.g.. State v. Vargas, 
2001 UT 5, Tf 28 n.7, 20 P.3d 271 (in discussing the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment and Article I § 12, the Court explained that the confrontation requirement 
impresses the witness of the duty to tell the truth, subjects the witness to cross-
examination, and gives the jury the opportunity to assess the witness's credibility). 
The fact that the prosecutor opted to assert this evidence at the end of his final 
rebuttal argument demonstrates the value of the evidence to his case, and the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence. The State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
e.g., Winship, supra, and was left with the unenviable job of meeting that burden with the 
testimony of two conflicting crack cocaine users, Roselynn Ellis and Tamara Ross. See 
Statement of Facts, supra. Despite the fact that their testimony concerning the alleged 
aggravated robbery did not conflict (R. 235 at 69, 125), the jurors disbelieved them and 
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acquitted Powell of that count (R. 127). Had the prosecutor not been permitted to 
introduce the evidence that Powell was a convicted felon who supposedly lied to the 
police about his name and then to the jurors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different 
result on the remaining counts as well. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
To the degree that trial counsel did not preserve the issues discussed above, this 
Court should nonetheless address and correct the error under the exceptional 
circumstances, plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies/" as a "'safety device5" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, Tf 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and 
Article I § 12, Powell must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below 
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient 
performance was prejudicial. See e^g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert. 
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994). 
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One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e.g.. State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at f^ 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes 
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by this Court with 
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the 
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have 
been valid trial strategy). ; 
The law forbidding prosecutors to misstate the evidence has been the law for years 
in this State, see, e^g., Troy, as has the law forbidding prosecutors to present prior crimes 
evidence solely to establish a criminal defendant's criminal propensities, see, 
e.g., Saunders. The trial court and trial counsel both should have intervened when the 
prosecutor misstated the evidence so graphically, and introduced Powell's status as a 
felon to establish his criminal character. See id. The prejudice from these incidents 
combines with the prejudice from the prosecutor's introduction and heavy reliance on the 
case manager's speculative testimony that Powell provided a false name to the police, and 
the procedural prejudice of the erroneous jury instructions and lack of lesser offense 
instructions, to require a new trial, because the cumulative effect of the errors undermines 
reasonable confidence in the fairness and reliability of the proceedings. See Kohl, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
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This Court should reverse Powell's convictions and remand this matter for retrial. 
Respectfully submitted this January £5, 2006.. 
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ADDENDUM 
TRANSCRIPTS OF TRIAL COURT RULINGS 
MR. SIMMS: I would ask -- the objection is personal 
knowledge on this particular case. If he has personal 
knowledge of a name given. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: No, I asked — 
THE COURT: No, that's not it. Overruled. You may 
go forward. 
Q (BY MR. UPDEGROVE) In the report that you make, as 
the arrested person do you use the name that is given to you? 
A As far as how they're booked into jail? 
Q Yes. 
A Is that what you're asking? A majority of the time, 
yes, sir. 
Q All right. In this specific case, what was the name 
that was given to the officers, that you got in booking for the 
individual that's sitting right there when you — 
MR. SIMMS: Objection, hearsay. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. UPDEGROVE) What is the name that was used? 
A I — I understood and I was told that the name used 
and booked under was James Johnson. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And may I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (BY MR. UPDEGROVE) I hand you — do you recognize 
that particular sheet of paper that I've handed you? 
A Yes, sir. 
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MR. SIMMS: I think that is the issue is rational 
basis for acquitting and the lesser included. 
THE COURT: It's an and. 
MR. SIMMS: It is an and, and that is the issue. And 
what we're presenting is the same. If they discount, saying 
that the victim was on crack Cocaine or medicine or drinking 
that night and we really can't believe what she said so those 
events didn't occur, there's a rational basis for that in terms 
of the gun and the trigger being pulled, so they discount that, 
they don't believe that, they do believe that she was hit over 
the head, so there is a rational basis for acquitting of the 
attempted murder and yet convicting on the assault, you know, 
the primary theory in our case is the defendant wasn't there, 
he didn't do that. That would — straight acquittal. And it 
wouldn't entitle us to a lesser included because our position 
is he wasn't there at all. 
So our argument now to the Court isn't that he wasn't 
there, our argument is that they could discount the fact the 
gun was put to her head and that the trigger was pulled, they 
can disregard any of that witness's testimony and they can 
choose not to believe that. And if they do choose to not 
believe that then they can believe that that person in fact hit 
her over the head with the gun then we have a different level 
of assault. 
THE COURT: I have reviewed the testimony here and 
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there certainly is a possibility that the jury would not 
believe any of the witnesses. However, the State's case does 
not just hinge on the testimony of Ms. Ellis. Ms. Ross herself 
testified that the defendant turned to the victim and said, I'm 
going to kill you, clicked the gun two times, that Ms. Ross 
could see him clicking it two times, pointing it at this 
victim's head in the car as well. So you have more than one 
witness. The standard here is a rational basis for an 
acquittal and of the greater offense and the conviction of the 
included or lesser offense. 
Based on looking at all of the evidence that the jury 
will weigh, the jury can always acquit, but a rational basis 
for an acquittal and of a conviction of a lesser offense I just 
cannot find by the evidence and so I'm going to not permit the 
lesser included offenses. Were they to believe the witnesses, 
then it would clearly fall under an attempted murder. That is, 
pointing the gun to the victim's head and pulling the trigger 
on four different occasions, two times inside, two times 
outside the motel room, and that is attempted murder. 
All right. I will, then, take your Long instruction, 
Mr. Simms, I'll put together the jury instructions that we have 
agreed to and I will certainly separate the one indicating that 
Mr. Powell has testified, use that — 
MR. SIMMS: Yes. 
THE COURT: — witness stock instruction. And let's 
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICTS ON ATTEMPTED MURDER 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, THOMAS CHARLES 
POWELL, of the offense of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder as 
charged in Count III of the Information, you must find from all 
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one 
of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 12th day of January, 2003, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, THOMAS CHARLES 
POWELL, attempted to cause the death of Roselynn Ellis; and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) 
intentionally or knowingly; or (b) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he knowingly 
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to 
Roselynn Ellis and and thereby attempted to cause the death of 
Roselynn Ellis; and 
3. That said defendant then and there did so unlawfully. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Attempted Criminal Homicide, 
Murder as charged in Count III of the Information. If, on the 
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty of Count III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers 
to probability of the risk of death greater than just a 
"substantial and unjustifiable" risk. A "grave risk of death" 
means a highly likely probability that death will result from 
the risk that the defendant knowingly creates. 
The term "knowingly" as used in the definition of depraved 
indifference murder means that the actor knew the nature of his 
conduct, knew the circumstances that gave rise to the risk of 
death, and knew that the risk constituted a grave risk of death, 
but he need not have had as his conscious objective or desire to 
cause the result; nor, need he be aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the results i.e., death. 
The term "depraved indifference to human life" refers not 
to the subjective culpable mental state of depraved indifference 
murder, but rather to an objective reasonable person standard as 
to the value of human life. "Depraved indifference" means an 
utter callousness toward the value of human life and a complete 
and total indifference as to whether one's conduct will create a 
grave risk of death to another. Thus, a finding of depraved 
indifference must be based on an objective evaluation of the 
magnitude of the risk created and of all the circumstances 
surrounding the death. That evaluation should focus on the 
gravity of the risk to human life that is created and the 
callousness of attitude toward that risk. In evaluating the 
evidence, the jury should consider the following factors: (1) 
the utility of the defendant's conduct which caused the death; 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
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(2) the magnitude of the risk created by the defendant's 
conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk; and (4) any 
precaution taken by the defendant to minimize that risk. 
INSTRUCTION NO. y* 
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, that person engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the 
offense. 
Conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense. No defense to the offense of attempt arises because 
the offense attempted was actually committed or due to factual 
or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed 
had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
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REQUESTED LESSER OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Assault unless all of the following elements are true beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
2. The Defendant, Thomas Powell; 
3. Committed an act with unlawful force or violence; 
4. That caused bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty. 
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser 
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 
guilty. 
U.C. A. §76-5-102 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Assault unless all of the following elements are true beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
2. The Defendant, Thomas Powell; 
3. Committed an act with unlawful force or violence; 
4. That caused bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty. 
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser 
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor, unless all of the following 
elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about January 12,2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
2. The Defendant, Thomas Powell; 
3. Committed an act with unlawful force or violence; 
4. That caused substantial bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty. 
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser 
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of 
the lesser included offense of Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor, unless all of the following 
elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
2, The Defendant, Thomas Powell; 
3, Committed an act with unlawful force or violence; 
4. That caused substantial bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk 
of bodily injury to another. 
If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty. 
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser 
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant 
guilty. 
U.C. A. §76-5-102 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of 
Aggravated Assault, as a lesser included offense unless each and every one of the 
following elements are true and correct beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah; 
2. The Defendant, Thomas Powell; 
3. Intentionally and knowingly committed an act with unlawful force or 
violence; 
4. That Thomas Powell than and there intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to Roselynn Ellis. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault, as charged in the 
information. However, if the prosecution has not proved each and every one of the 
foregoing elements of Aggravated Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
Thomas Powell not guilty. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one 
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a 
prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction 
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, Attempt—Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime; 
and 
(b)(1) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actorfs mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the 
attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
1. Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Murder (2002) 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3: 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(I) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-
404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402: 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405: 
(0) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the 
actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another; 
(d)(1) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to 
the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the 
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or 
attempted commission of any predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or 
attempted commission of: 
(1) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 
if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under 
Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the 
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another: 
(I) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under 
the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(I) emotional distress does not include: 
(I) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(I) or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(I) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201. Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, 
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of 
persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at 
night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or 
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises 
or such portion thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor. 
§ 76-6-202. Burglary 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b)theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5: or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in 
the building. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from 
a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is 
not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section 
76-1-601. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Robbery 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or 
temporarily of the personal property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against 
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601: 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery1 if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or 
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the 
business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those 
rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his wife; 
and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, 
or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, 
upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO 
PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence 
of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to Rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 602. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal 
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness1 own testimony. This rule is subject 
to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
1.(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall 
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence 
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it 
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time Limit Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of 
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a 
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a 
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been 
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or 
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of 
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense 
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that 
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence 
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct 
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement, 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject 
to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with 
the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has 
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the 
person; or 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the 
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, 
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
